Abstract -This paper tests the impact of mandated disclosure regulation on merger & acquisition (M&A) activity by studying the extension of the U.S. mandated disclosure regime to companies trading on the over-the-counter (OTC) securities market, the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964. The Securities Acts Amendments are an excellent test case of the effects on M&A activity due to (i) the large number of affected OTC companies, (ii) the typical paucity of disclosure among OTC companies before the passage of the legislation, (iii) the absence of any severe macroeconomic shocks during the test period and (iv) the natural control group provided by the non-OTC companies not affected by the Securities Acts Amendments. The paper tests the impact of mandated disclosure on M&A activity among OTC companies during the 1955-75 period in two ways, regression analysis and comparison with M&A activity among non-OTC companies. Both tests in the paper strongly support the views of several academics and practitioners that mandated disclosure provides useful information to the market and that this information encourages higher levels of M&A activity.
recently passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 5 ("SOX"). Part II.b discusses the consensus that has emerged that the far-reaching disclosure regulation in SOX will have an unintended impact on M&A activity.
II. Disclosure regulation and M&A activity a. The theoretical support and critique of the link between disclosure regulation and M&A activity
There are theoretical arguments both supporting and questioning the idea that mandated disclosure will have an impact on M&A activity. In support of this contention, first, as Henry
Manne noted in his seminal piece on M&A, the "fundamental premise underlying the market for corporate control" is that managerial efficiency must be reflected in the market price of a company's shares. 6 To do so, information regarding managerial efficiency must be available.
Second, an increase in publicly available information will lower the search and verification costs associated with identifying and analyzing M&A targets. Third, more and accurate information reduces the information asymmetry between buyer and seller, thus alleviating the potential for a bidder to suffer a 'winner's curse' situation, therefore encouraging more bids and, thus, more M&A activity.
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The primary theoretical counter to the idea that mandated disclosure will impact markets, including the M&A market, is that even without mandated disclosure there is already a market for disclosure. In the disclosure market companies and investors will effectively buy and sell information. If this market is working properly with sufficient competition, then the market should ensure that an efficient level of disclosure occurs in the absence of mandated disclosure.
This argument has been advanced by some commentators to argue that regulatory disclosure is 5 ineffective and inefficient. 8 However, proponents of securities regulation have long argued that collective action problems among shareholders create failures in the disclosure market that prevent an unregulated market from producing an efficient level of disclosure.
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b. The importance of studying the effect of disclosure regulation on M&A activity
Given the important policy implications of the debate surrounding mandated disclosure, empirical evidence supporting or undermining the various theoretical positions on the issue is critical. The sweeping legislative reaction of Congress to the corporate scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 10 has reignited deliberation over the virtues and transgressions of mandated disclosure, in particular with regard to M&A activity. SOX is focused on improving corporate accounting and public reporting practices. While SOX does not explicitly mention an intended effect on M&A activity, the legislation is expected to have a significant impact on the pace of M&A transactions. 11 The majority opinion seems to be that SOX will have a negative impact on M&A activity.
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This concern is primarily based on the implications of SOX Sections 302 and 404, 13 which require, respectively, SEC-registered companies to provide quarterly and annual certifications of internal controls for the whole company, including any acquisitions. 14 Failure to include acquisitions or to accurately reflect acquisitions in these certifications would run a company afoul with the SEC and potentially lead to personal liability for a company's executive officers. As a result, it is expected that companies will feel compelled to spend more resources on due diligence of a target's internal controls and accounting practices during the M&A process, and that smaller companies that cannot afford the high cost of SOX compliance will no longer be acceptable targets for SEC-registered companies. 15 Given the higher transaction costs, reduction in available targets and risk that an acquisition will interfere with an acquiror's SOX compliance, a natural conclusion is that M&A levels will drop as a result of SOX.
However, a minority of commentators believe that SOX will have a beneficial long-term impact on M&A activity and some expect SOX to reinvigorate the M&A market for several reasons. First, SOX should ensure "complete and accurate disclosure, more transparency and more confidence in the integrity of the public and private disclosure system that underpins all 
b. The database of M&A activity
The existing databases of M&A activity are not sufficient for a comprehensive study of M&A activity amongst the newly-covered OTC companies. Therefore, a unique database with the necessary information was created for this paper to study M&A activity amongst the group of newly-covered OTC companies for the period of January 1955 to December 1975.
To create the database, first the relevant group of OTC companies was assembled for the relevant time period. The relevant OTC companies are those which were likely to meet the disclosure requirements of the 1964 Act. The 1964 Act required registration within 120 days after the last day of a corporation's fiscal year after the effective date for companies with more than 750 shareholders and over $1 million in assets. 36 The 1964 Act also required registration within 120 days after the last day of a corporation's fiscal year two years after the effective date 34 Ferrell, at 12. 35 Compare Golbe, at 278-280 (a review of the literature reveals nine prior major studies with timeframes of 20 to 55 years, with a median timeframe of 25 years) and Poloncheck, at 113 (uses at timeframe of 22 years to study the impact of the Williams Act on M&A activity) with Ferrell, at 4 (using the 1962-68 timeframe to study the effect of the 1964 Act on stock returns) and Greenstone, at 16 (using the 1963-66 timeframe to study the effect of the 1964 Act on stock returns). 36 Securities Acts Amendments (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) with July 1, 1964 as the "effective date").
for companies with between 500 and 750 shareholders and over $1 million in assets. covered OTC companies. An annual tabulation of the number of companies in the dataset was then created by tracking the cumulative number of unique companies that had been added to the dataset while subtracting out companies that disappeared due to M&A activity, non-M&A endof-life events or name changes. The total number of net newly-covered OTC companies in the dataset, by year, is presented in Table 1 . companies, the unreported portion of asset valuation was calculated by assuming that the unreported deals in a given year had an average deal size that was 50% of the reported median deal size by asset for that year.
c. Analytical models
By using well-developed M&A regression models and comparing the newly-covered OTC company M&A data with that of other groups, an abnormal increase in OTC M&A activity can be detected by controlling for the factors that otherwise affect M&A levels. There have generally been two methods for testing the effect of policy changes on M&A activity. The first method ("regression") is to place the implementation of the legislation as a dummy variable into a regression analysis with other metrics that typically predict the level of M&A activity, such as average stock company valuations, the cost of capital, the size of the economy, changes in tax regimes, changes in prices, divergence of opinions on future economic performance, and antitrust regulation activity. 45 The second method ("composition") is to examine the type of M&A activity before and after the policy change, predicting what types of M&A activity should be encouraged or discouraged by the policy and then analyzing whether those predictions were reflected in the subsequent data. 46 In the case of the 1964 Act, a third method ("comparison")
could be added -comparing the M&A activity within the newly covered group of OTC companies to companies previously covered by the Exchange Act. This method has been used previously when, for example, comparing M&A activity in different countries. 47 In this methodology the M&A activity and aggregate deal value among the broader Federal Trade 45 See, e.g., Polonchek, at 116 (uses a dummy variable for the Williams Act in an M&A regression model); see also Golbe & White (a discussion of previous empirical studies on determinants of U.S. merger activity and a ranking of the most relevant independent variables for M&A regression analysis); Warshawsky, at 6-9 (discussing the impact of antirust policy on M&A activity). 46 See, e.g., Scholes, at S153-54, 58 (analyzing the number of management buyouts, leveraged buyouts and acquisitions of U.S. companies by non-U.S. companies to test the impact of tax policy changes in the 1980s Secondly, while disclosure might be expected to increase the absolute level of M&A activity, there is no reason to think it will change the composition of that M&A activity. Therefore, the focus of this paper is on the regression and comparison methods.
i. Regression method
For the regression method of analysis the following model was used:
M&A t = α t + β 1 Q t + β 2 CK t + β 3 GNP t + β 4 PPI t + β 5 LS t + β 6 ANT t + β 7 D65 t
Where M&A is the number of annual M&A deals completed during the period, Q is tax-adjusted Tobin's q, CK is cost of capital, GNP is U.S. Gross National Product, PPI is the variance in the U.S. Producer Price Index, LS is the variance in Livingston Survey of economic opinion, ANT is the adjusted number of antitrust cases instituted by the Department of Justice, and D65 is a binomial dummy variable for the 1964 Act.
The general determinants of M&A activity in the regression model follow the determinants of M&A activity already identified in the literature. Golbe & White in their study of M&A time-series analyses identify and justify the independent variables that have been used in previous analyses of M&A activity. They identify valuation, variance in price levels, divergences in economic opinion, the real cost of capital, the size of the economy and tax law as the principal determinants of M&A activity in the post-war period . 48 For the post-war period they found that nominal GNP and Tobin's q (tax-adjusted and unadjusted) had positive, 48 Golbe, at 280-84. A variable representing the year was also added for trend control in some regressions.
This variable simply takes the value of the year in question.
ii. Comparison method
The However, a comparison can still be made across groups by indexing M&A activity levels to their respective starting levels in 1955.
d. Data sources for the regression and comparison models
The metrics for the independent variables required for the M&A regression model are widely available. Economy-wide valuation levels for the purpose of M&A regression are typically estimated by using the Tobin's q ratio of an asset's market value to its replacement cost. 55 The changes in tax regimes can either be accounted for by including a dummy variable or by using a tax-adjusted Tobin's q ratio metric. 56 product ("GNP"), which is tracked by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 59 Price changes can be estimated by the producer price index ("PPI"), tracked by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 60 Divergences of opinion on economic growth projections can be measured through the Livingston Survey data maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 61 Antitrust regulation has been approximated by the number of antitrust cases instituted by both the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and private parties, or by the expenditures of the DOJ's Antitrust Division. 62 Given the other influences on the government budgetary process, the number of cases instituted seems to be a better proxy for the regulatory stance in a given period than expenditures. When using the number of cases instituted as the proxy for antitrust enforcement, the number of cases should be adjusted for changes in the absolute number of firms or a surrogate, such as GNP. 63 The typical data used to track aggregate U.S. M&A activity during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was complied by the FTC. 64 The FTC data covers the period from 1948 to 1979 but is limited to mergers in the manufacturing and mining sectors where the target had assets greater than $10 million. 65 The FTC data also contains the asset values for the target companies in the dataset as well as annually aggregated asset values for all included M&A deals.
The corresponding asset values for the newly-covered OTC companies were collected from two sources. First, to the extent the OTC M&A activity was captured in the FTC data, the shows the best explanatory power for OTC M&A activity levels. Furthermore, while other 66 REVIEW PUBLISHING CO., OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES HANDBOOK (1957-58, 1961-62, 1963-64, 1965-66, 1967-68, 1969-70, 1972-73) . 67 The dummy represents the 1964 Act going into effect at the beginning of 1965 such that 1955-64 were given a value of zero and 1965-75 were given a value of one in regressions.
IV. Results

a. Overview
variables, such as nominal GNP and tax-adjusted Tobin's q, also shows significant effects on M&A activity, their impact is nowhere near as consistent as the 1965 dummy variable.
Taken together both methodologies strongly support the noteworthy conclusion that better available information related to mandated disclosure regulation promotes higher levels of M&A activity.
b. Comparison method
The data shows that there is a higher level of M&A activity among the newly-covered 1955  1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974 $16 bn 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 OTC FTC Note: Deal value based on asset value of target firm in constant 1972 dollars Running the FTC M&A data for 1955-75 against the standard determinants of M&A activity it is possible to generally recreate many of the results found in the literature (see Table 3 and below). Note: * is significant at 90%; ** is significant at 95%; *** is significant at 98%.
The well-documented 1967-69 merger "wave," one of four such events documented in the last century, 72 affected the M&A activity levels of both newly-covered OTC companies and the broader FTC group. Because these waves are sometimes explained by factors such as managerial psychology ("hubris") and mass behavior ("market manias") that are not easily quantified, 73 it is also useful to perform the regression analyses excluding data from the 1967-69
period. For the OTC data, regression analysis without the 1967-69 data shows great improvement in the explanatory value of the GNP and Tobin's q variables as well as the overall fit of the regression model (see Table 5 , Rg. 1-3). The 1965 dummy variable remains significant and positive. Conversely, and similar to the analysis on the full data set, the regressions on the FTC data set without the 1967-69 data (Rg. 4-6) yield low fit metrics and consistently significant Note: * is significant at 90%; ** is significant at 95%; *** is significant at 98%.
V. Conclusion
Changes in disclosure regulation are believed to have unintended effects on M&A activity levels, however, these effects have not previously been studied. This paper shows an abnormal, positive impact on M&A activity levels from the 1964 extension of the mandated disclosure regulation to over-the-counter securities while controlling for the other determinants of M&A activity levels. This impact was demonstrated through both a comparison with measures of M&A activity levels among companies generally not covered by the 1964 Act as well as regression analysis that controlled for the standard determinants of M&A activity levels.
Both methodologies strongly support the conclusion that the 1964 Act increased M&A activity -30 -levels among the newly-covered OTC companies. Establishing that the 1964 Act had a positive influence on M&A activity better informs the current debate about the impact that the recentlyimplemented Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have M&A activity, by lending support to the minority position that SOX will have a long-term beneficial effect on M&A levels. However, one should caveat any policy conclusions with regard to SOX because of possible differences in the marginal impact of mandated disclosure through the 1964 Act and SOX. As previously stated, disclosure among OTC companies was "meager and inadequate" prior to the 1964 Act. 74 This was clearly not the case for publicly-traded companies prior to SOX and one can expect diminishing marginal returns from disclosure regulation. Nevertheless, in the much more mature debate about the effectiveness of disclosure regulation generally, the results of this paper suggest that mandated disclosure does add new, valuable information to the market.
74 Supra notes 30-31.
